M+A: Success ratio lower than at Russion Roulette
31/12/2010
Treat Private Equity as normal Companies
30/12/2010
Heathrow Airport Manager 'foregoes' his bonus
23/12/2010
Foreign Listings: A regulatory Black Hole
Bank Pay: Special Case of a general Problem
22/12/2010
Ireland, Hungary expropriate pension funds
13/12/2010
No effective Inquiry into high speed trading
12/12/2010
Abusive Merger Practices: Period of Exclusivity
11/12/2010
Southern Cross - heavy debtload legacy from Private Equity Days?
11/12/2010
The future of Pensions - must reads for the concerned
a few tasty morsels of wisdom:
"If the objective of government is the cessation of
provision of voluntary private sector occupational
pensions, it should say so. If not, it should not allow its
civil servants to adopt policies and practices which
ensure that this will occur."
The savings adequacy problemis compounded by theAnd another paper well worth reading:
fact that DC ‘pensions’ are just tax-advantaged savings
schemes which leave the individual exposed to risks
which are unmanageable"
Tomorrow's investor: building the consensus for a People's Pension in Britain by David Pitt-Watson
07/12/2010
No improvement in pay practices at banks - study
01/12/2010
French Takeover regulation a laughing stock
31/10/2010
U.S. seeks to shield Goldman Sachs Secrets
Pro Gov continues to argue that the trading process in listed securities markets cannot be allowed to be dominated by secretive algorithms that are suspected to skim off profits at the expense of public order flow - be it from retail or institutional investors. The NYSE for example used have - and still has - very open rules about 'priority and predence' in relation to the execution of orders. In the age of computers it should also be possible to ensure that clear rules are adhered to - even if orderflow is measured in nanoseconds.
28/10/2010
Shareholder anger at relocation expenses
Activist investors are turning up the heat on companies that give relocating executives generous benefits to cover the cost of their depressed home values (Wall Street Journal, 25 Oct 2010)
While the issue of relocation expenses may appear to be of minor importance it is an issue that can and should be closely monitored by the investing institutions that are to a large extent the fiduciaries of private investors. It is unrealistic to expect institutional money managers to micro-manage the businesses they are investing in. It is not their job to decide, for example, what goods a department store will have in the showroom for the Christmas season. Therefore calls for investors to 'have a dialogue' with management is an empty gesture. (Apart from the question how managers would have fireside chats with possibly hundreds of fund managers and analysts in the case of large corporations. Equally, fund managers with several hundred holdings cannot be expected to have conversations with all those companies). So the only way forward to improve corporate oversight is to set clear guidelines and rules that investee companies have to meet. Help with relocation expenses depends on business judgement - just like any other form of pay. We at Pro Gov argue that the pay for top management should follow rigid guidelines. If pay at the top is under control the pay further down the ranks would also follow a more moderate path.
26/10/2010
High-Frequency Trader fined in US
13/10/2010
Who consults the REAL investors?
11/10/2010
When is a Bonus not a Bonus?
11/10/2010
May 'Flash Crash': Blame the Computer!
(01/10/2010)
Who represents the investing public?
(29/09/2010)
Punishments meted out at Companies miss target
(29/09/2010)
Whose Gold coins do high-frequency traders pick up?
Independent Investment Research under Threat
But if his claim that several associations that represent stock analysts or the securities industry declined his requests to help him pay his legal bills it leaves a sour taste in the mouth - to say the least. What use are the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, the New York Society of Security Analysts and the CFA Institute if they decline to make a stand for independent investment research. To cap it all, they declined to comment when approached by the New York Times. Even worse - the investment bank Ladenburg Thalmann, his then employer, chose to settle its end of the case by paying BankAtlantic $350,000, without admitting to any wrongdoing, and leaving Mr. Bove to defend himself. We are glad to report that Bove won his court case against the Bank but is still left with legal bills totalling $800,000. The stakes in a case like this are high as any successful lawsuit against an analyst would deter critical analyst comments in the future and stifle independent research. (12/09/2010)
Are Media Investors responsible?
Pensions not secure from political meddling
Individuals think markets are not fair
Fund Management Industry: whose interests does it protect?
But rather than fight among themselves the industry should be united in condemning protectionist policies as they ultimately lead to higher costs for the investors. (14/07/2010)
Intermix Acquisition: Directors accused of favoring bidder
Spread Betting firm worth more than London Stock Exchange
Executive Pensions: transparency not enough
CVC to give less information
Crowd calling for head of Prudential Chairman
We thought from the outset that the Prudential's attempt to bid for AIG's Asian business was a bid too far. Now some major institutional shareholders are said to try to effect changes in the Pru's executive suite.
But under a regime of proper corporate governance it would never have been possible for the management of a company to stray so far from the wishes of its shareholders. Permission to attempt a significant acquisition (or disposal) always be required beforehand. As a consequence the expensive replacement of senior management would also be unnecessary.
Realistic Taxes on Private Equity Managers
Carried Interest should never have been treated as capital gain, the only exception could be the returns on the actual cash that has been invested by the managers of the Private Equity Funds. Even there they may benefit from loopholes. They may allot themselves a higher share of the equity interest than is reflected by the amount of cash they put in. The same loophole may benefit the management of the portfolio companies, their equity interest usually differs widely from their actual cash investment. Maybe this tax treatment explains some - or even most - of the ability of the private equity industry to convince managers in public companies to join them (or facilitate their purchase of companies or subsidiaries at advantageous terms). We always had our reservations about the industry's claim of superior management performance. It would be much cheaper for the ultimate owner of industry - the public investors - to simply change management rather than sell out only to later buy the same businesses back at a much higher price.
Tax honesty on Carried Interest for 'Private' Equity
How to regulate High-Frequency Trading - part 2
After last week's 'fat-finger-accident' a full investigation into the methods of HFT is required more urgently than ever. This should comprise full public disclosure of complete transaction records so that independent outside analysis would be possible. This would help to find answers to two questions in particular: (1) is the high-frequency trading fair to all market participants (2) who profits from it? As some major firms guard the secrets of their algorithmic trading (Goldman Sachs for example persecutes a former employee who it accuses of taking proprietary information about algorithms) there is a suspicion that things are skewed against the wider investing public - why else would someone try to keep information secret?
A quote from Barron's Magazine may shed further light on this problem: "our market structure has evolved to cater to masters of expensive technology, deployed unfettered by participants whose only concern is to squeeze out every last picosecond and fractional cent." (Sal Arnuk and Joe Saluzzi of Themis Trading).
Prudential: what deal has been agreed regarding capital adaequacy?
The pension system in this country to a large extent depends on private companies such as the Prudential to supply savers/retirees with a rock-solid guarantee that they will be there when and as long as they are needed. Deals such as the one just announced can at best be described as a stitch-up where the public is left in the dark about the exact terms and no one but the FSA, the quango in charge of protecting the interests or savers, investors and retirees, knows what standards are applied. Even worse, should a disaster occur and the provider get into trouble the government can simply walk away - even if the financial regulator made errors in assessing the financial health of the insurer. That shareholders are also kept in the dark is par for the course. As a German banker once famously said: Shareholders are stupid and insolent: stupid to invest and insolent to expect a dividend.
P.S.: It may amuse the reader that The Times has refused to publish a version of the above comment on its Website. We can only assume that we have touched a raw nerve and that the editors did not want to give the impression that they allow criticism of the authorities to be published on their site.
Does Politics have to get involved in Governance?
UK: Savings no answer to foreign takeovers
Time to restrict 'Private' Equity?
False assumptions behind Defined-Contribution Pensions
FSA clamps down on insider dealing - or does it?
US Lobbies stonewall increased shareholder influence
Lehman, Cerberus and Bawag - Private Equity needs more transparency
While not asking for an outright ban on buy-outs we are for a long time calling for regulations that would force 'Private' Equity firms and their investors to disclose more information about their business. In this case it is not possible for depositors in the bank to make an informed judgement about the ultimate guardians of the institution. The ultimate stakeholders in the unnamed investors (likely to be pensioners and other public savers) are also kept in the dark about the activities of their trustees (management of their funds) as well as the terms and conditions of their investment.
One has to wonder about the tax status of this construction and where taxes are ultimately to be paid.
Tommy Hilfiger: another black eye for public shareholders
Shorts, Lehman and Price Discovery
But what does this article prove? That the world should thank Einhorn for helping to precipitate the collapse of Lehman Brothers? If the short sellers have such a big heart they should just state their concerns and hope that management or the other shareholders - who are the ultimate controllers of a company - act upon the advice. That is at least what one would expect a responsible owner to do. One look at the share register of most listed companies makes it clear that most companies are effectively controlled by the same small circle of large institutional investors (BlackRock, Fidelity etal) and in a rational world it should not be beyond the power of the highly-qualified and well-paid professionals among their staff to be responsible guardians of the investor's interest. These firms are the ultimate force behind nearly all of corporate America (and by extension the World) and they can no longer hide behind arcane regulations or passing the buck to the governments.