Shrinking Universe of Listed Companies - that's why!

No wonder that the universe of listed companies is shrinking. It is much too easy to gain control of companies and take them off the public markets. A tiny number of votes above the 50% threshold should not be allowed to force the remaining shareholders out of their holdings. No wonder that stakeholders are disregarded and sacrificed on the mantra of simplistic corporate constitutions.
(3-April-2019)
Roche fails to get control of Spark

Dual-class voting shares - are our Fiduciaries standing firm?

Canny insiders - with the help of advisers among investment banks - are steadily eroding shareholder rights. There is opposition but it is piecemeal and split. Reality is, if the major fiduciaries in the asset management business would get together and put their feet down this unhealthy development would be stopped very quickly. I would not go so far as to call these structures the biggest threat to financial markets but they are just one more factor behind the continuous increase in Inequality.
(27-Mar-2019)
Dual-class structures biggest threat to financial markets

Who runs our Companies? Proxy Firms? ETF Providers?

A lot of noise had been created about the (supposed) undue influence that 'passive' investors (and ETF providers in particular) may or may not exert on investee companies. But the elephant in the room really are the few proxy firms that dominate voting advice to most investment managers. Apart from the fact that it is unclear how much of an extra burden their fees heap on the charges that the real end investor has to bear (without ever being asked), their 'advice' (basically nothing but another opinion for which they will never be called to account) in many cases ends up in the proverbial waster paper basket as their clients often ignore this expensive advice. Apart from that the self-imposed voting principles that proxy firms publish on a regular basis are devoid of any input from end investors and the wider public (are we not in a new age where wider stakeholder interests should be included in good corporate practice?) (9-March-2019)
Elliott's key proposals for hyundai dealt a blow by Glass Lewis

The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs 2019

This 2019 study is the fifth report by As You Sow. During these five years, what has changed? Quite a bit, and not enough. Significantly, more large shareholders are voting against more CEO pay packages. Those who are not are more isolated and defensive (25-Feb).
As You Sow

UK bank CEOs paid 120 times as much as average employee

The banks made the disclosures alongside full-year results over the past fortnight, ahead of new reporting requirements coming into force next year that oblige firms to set out the ratio of CEO pay to a median UK employee and those in the lowest and upper pay quartiles. (25-Feb)
Reuters

Proxy Advisers - cosy and intransparent cartel

Who gives the handful of proxy advisers to right to set their own 'policies'?
Do they ever ask the real end investor, - and not only the intermediaries that pay hefty fees with other peoples' money?
Why does it seem impossible for real end investors - and the public at large - to find out the fees that are paid to proxy firms so that they can do the work that the financial intermediaries should be doing, i.e. supervising the companies they invest in on behalf of the great unwashed public?
(10-Feb-2019)
ISS Policies on Compensation 

Board Evaluation -but who evaluates the evaluators?

Well intended maybe, but who evaluates the evaluators, and so on...
(10-Feb-2019)

Board Evaluation Disclosures - Council of Institutional Investors

Does UBS Chairman really deserve $ 6 Mio?

Or is he just an extremely well-paid PR operator? If American firms can get by without a separate Chairman is keeping such expensive staffers a necessary expense? Any decent IR professional could front such an announcement. Does anyone in the Corporate Governance crowd really care?
(22-Jan-2019)
UBS sees outflows of $13 Million

Blackrock's Larry Fink - confused or mischievous?

Interesting comment about Larry Fink's sudden commitment to better governance. Problem is, with his compensation he is sitting in the proverbial glasshouse. And in addition, as Alex Brummer correctly pointed out, Blackrock's governance policies are nebulous. No good hiring more and more governance 'experts' when they are left without clear guidelines. And the poor end investor (in most cases shielded from having any input into said guidelines by being only indirectly invested - via fiduciaries in pension funds, private banks or assorted platforms) is left standing in front of a closed 'governance universe' where self-appointed guardians of his interest are mostly talking to themselves.
The other interpretation of the half-hearted approach to governance would be that it is just another tool in the marketing arsenal of investment managers - grown out of necessity in order to follow the 'Zeitgeist' dominated by unaccountable pressure groups or lobbies.
(19-Jan-2019)
Larry Fink at Blackrock: Talk the walk, but need to walk the talk 

Yesterday I cam across another comment on Fink's letter - what do you think?
Naked Capitalism 

Chairman - a cushy sinecure for the Establisment

Looking at Philip Hampton's numerous board memberships one can notice one thing: not one of the companies he passed through can be seen as a thorough success - look at the list and point out one if you can find it! British obsession with the role of Chairmen is somewhat similar with the obsession of pack the House of Lords with superfluous worthies!
(21-Jan-2019)
About Philip Hampton
GSK Chairman to retire